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I N T R O D U C T I O N
On 20 December 1844, three men, Tom Peters, William Mering, and John
Sharp, swore before the Police Magistrate in Freetown, Sierra Leone, that
they had recently been captured and sold into the transatlantic slave trade—
for the second time in their lives. All three had previously lived in the
British colony of Sierra Leone as “liberated Africans”— the Royal Navy had
captured them from slave ships and registered them to serve apprenticeships
on time-limited contracts, in accordance with anti-slave-trade treaties.1 After
apprenticeship, Peters and Mering had traveled outside the colony,
southwards to Sherbro and the Gallinas River, to work in the extensive canoe
trade of the Upper Guinea Coast. Sharp had migrated eastwards, to work on a
farm in Soamah, in the Mende country. But at an unspecified time, kidnappers
and rulers had captured them: Peters was traded for ivory, Mering detained on
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the pretext of damaging property, and Sharp held as compensation for the crimes
of an acquaintance, who “took” another man’s wife.2
By November 1844, Louis, a Spanish slave trader operating in the Sherbro
region, had bought all three men and “plenty other slaves.” He dismissed their
protests that they were “Her Majesty’s subjects.” Louis flogged and chained
them in barracoons, the holding facilities from which slave traders would
embark the three men on canoes, and then ocean-going ships. Another
subject of Sierra Leone, Elizabeth Eastman, had tried to help Tom Peters.
Louis punished her by flogging her so severely that he allegedly caused the
miscarriage of her pregnancy and possibly even killed her.3 Unjust detention
had morphed into sale to transatlantic traders and fatal violence. The
prospect of redemption was fading fast.
Louis embarked Peters, Mering, Sharp, and 345 other captives on the
Spanish ship Engañador. But early in the voyage a British ship captured the
Engañador and brought it north to Freetown. The Anglo-Spanish Court of
Mixed Commission then re-released the captives, again as “liberated
Africans.” After the Governor of Sierra Leone received copies of the
statements that the three men gave to the magistrate, he authorized a naval
expedition to seek redress and “pledges” from local African chiefs against the
future capture or re-enslavement of liberated Africans. When the three men
had made their statements, they could not have foreseen British warships
sailing southwards with such a mandate. But now, violence was on the horizon.
The chain linking Peters, Mering, and Sharp to British naval retaliation
against the Sherbro chiefs illustrates a major problem regarding abolition:
political authorities struggled to define how anti-slave-trade law should
operate among polities. As in the case of these three men, the norms for
legal regulation could quickly morph from defining jurisdiction to violent
confrontation. What does their story tell us about the process of abolition?
How did anti-slave-trade jurisdictions relate to sovereign jurisdiction, which
in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world usually involved sovereigns
applying either free soil or slave soil within territorial borders?4 How and
2 On certain Africans’ experiences of enslavement and subsequent ‘liberation’ in Sierra Leone,
see P.E.H. Hair, “The Enslavement of Koelle’s Informants,” Journal of African History 6 (1965):
193–203.
3 Lieutenant-Governor William Fergusson to Commodore William Jones, 20 Jan. 1845, encl.
(mislabelled 20 Dec. 1845) “Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape
of Good Hope, Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands; Reports from British Vice-Admiralty
Courts and Naval Officers on Slave Trade: 1845 (Class A),” 19th Century House of Commons
Sessional Papers, vol. 50, paper 723 (Jan. 1846), pp. 34–37.
4 Sue Peabody and Keila Grinberg, “Free Soil: The Generation and Circulation of an Atlantic
Legal Principle,” Slavery & Abolition 32 (Sept. 2011): 331–39; Cristina Nogueira da Silva and
Keila Grinberg, “Soil Free from Slaves: Slave Law in Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-
Century Portugal,” Slavery & Abolition 32 (Sept. 2011): 431–46; Ada Ferrer, “Haiti, Free Soil,
and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic,” American Historical Review 117 (2012): 40–66.
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why did regulation shift from coercive violence to settled compromise, and vice
versa?
From various perspectives, social theorists and historians have analyzed
the relationship between law, coercion, and society in different ways.
Analyses have assigned primacy to codes, institutions, social practices, or
economic change (inter alia) in shaping legal regulation and enforcement,
and in turn being shaped by them. For instance, Max Weber’s modernity
through rational decision-making, Pierre Bourdieu’s “entire social universe,”
and E. P. Thompson’s typology of law as institution, personnel, ideology,
and rule of law all envisaged law as constitutive of society. Law was a tool
for social domination and reproduction because it facilitated elites’
consolidation of control. Judicial hierarchy, high qualifications for entry into
the legal field, and the symbolic power to name aided this consolidation, but
also provided opportunities for resistance movements and social change.5
One major aim for these scholars was to explain how the state’s unified
jurisdiction developed out of competition to control resource extraction,
fragmentary class interests, and sectional differences. Jurists’ symbolic
capital reflected and created a worldview that ensured widespread consent to
state jurisdiction.6 Elites used violence to create jurisdiction, and subsequent
enforcement was premised on police coercion, extrajudicial violence, and the
changing nature (and level) of consent.
But in the case of Peters, Mering, and Sharp, violence was not the whole
story. In addition to applying naval coercion, Lieutenant-Governor Fergusson
demanded “redress,” which involved exchanging human and non-human
property to re-establish order between Sierra Leone and the Sherbro chiefs.
As with law’s role in society, commodity exchanges were modes of
establishing and sustaining social order. From Bronislaw Malinowski and
Marcel Mauss onward, anthropologists have emphasized that commodity
exchanges, including gifting and trade, only make sense within the “totality”
of social relations.7 Mauss influentially enumerated the gift’s obligations
of giving, receiving, and repaying. Gift exchange distributed wealth and
5 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley, 1978), 641–776; E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin
of the Black Act (London, 1975), 260–62; Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a
Sociology of the Juridical Field,” Hastings Law Journal 38 (1986): 850; Pierre Bourdieu, Sur
L’état: Cours au Collège de France, 1989–1992, Patrick Champagne, Remi Lenoir, Franck
Poupeau, and Marie-Christine Rivière, eds. (Paris, 2012), 521; Mindie Lazarus-Black and Susan
F. Hirsch, Contested States: Law, Hegemony and Resistance (New York, 1994).
6 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, Peter B. Evans, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In
(Cambridge, UK, 1985), 169–91; Bourdieu, Sur L’état, 508–34.
7 BronislawMalinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and
Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea (London, 1972); Marcel Mauss, The
Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, Ian Cunnison, trans. (London, 1966).
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honor.8 As Marshall Sahlins demonstrated, Mauss envisaged the basis of social
order not in the war of all against all, but rather in the exchange of everything
with everybody.9
Gifting and commodity exchange were not necessarily peaceful, however.
As Annette Weiner has argued, elites have consolidated their position by
determining which objects may enter circulation as gifts and/or trading
goods.10 Such consolidation has also involved competition between elites to
give ever-grander gifts, earn increased honor, and thereby attain political
ascendancy.11 Exchange could precipitate violent conflict. For instance, in
the 1820s, on the Upper Guinea Coast, the chiefs of Falaba allegedly
discussed threatening the Limba with war to compel them to hand over
goods that Falaba could use to repay a gift to another group, the Mandinka.12
Like social theories of law, anthropological studies of gifting and exchange
have focused on cases where a shared worldview was possible and desirable.
Learning from social theorists of law and economic anthropologists, we find
that value exchange was analogous to law: it made sense only within all social
relations, it was amenable to elite consolidation of power and legitimacy, and
it created and consolidated worldviews, including of the life-cycle, gender
relations, maritime trade, and conflict resolution.
However, for anti-slave-trade jurisdiction, there was little prospect of a
shared worldview to underpin legitimacy. Polities in West Africa and the
Americas were reluctant signatories of abolition treaties and agreements that
British imperial hegemony had foisted upon them. The treaties established
new courts to adjudicate over captures of slave ships for most of the
nineteenth century until the ending of the transatlantic routes in the 1860s.
At the same time, British naval patrols meant that the breakdown into violent
confrontation was never far away. Anti-slave-trade jurisdiction involved
coercion in its origins and regulation, elite negotiation regarding local
jurisdiction over territory and people, and value exchange—all without the
premise of a shared worldview.
The mixed-commission treaty courts and vice-admiralty courts that
adjudicated captures, extrajudicial actions to “liberate” African captives, and
Law Officers’ advice in Britain regarding controversial seizures have been
the subject of recent scholarship. Scholars have fruitfully analyzed
developments in inter-polity law in the context of battles between Atlantic
8 C. A. Gregory, Gifts and Commodities (London, 1982).
9 Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (London, 1974), 170.
10 Annette B. Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving
(Berkeley, 1992).
11 Marilyn Strathern, “Discovering ‘Social Control,’” Journal of Law and Society 12 (1985):
111–34.
12 Alexander Gordon Laing, Travels in the Timannee, Kooranko, and Soolima Countries, in
Western Africa (London, 1825), 283.
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proslavery and antislavery ideologies. Others have focused on British
antislavery imperialism, underpinned by ideological distinctions between
“civilized” and “barbaric” polities, thereby contributing to a belief that
abolition required substantial political and commercial control of sub-
Saharan West Africa.13 Some related legal controversies, such as Burón v.
Denman, still inform the doctrine that acts of state are non-justiciable:
sovereign acts committed abroad deemed necessary for pursuing foreign
policy are not liable to court jurisdiction or to compensation claims by
subjects of other states.14
The approach here is complementary yet different: I see the courts as one
factor in making anti-slave-trade jurisdiction and law. Other important factors
included the actions of African and Brazilian political authorities, British
diplomats and naval officers, and the liberated Africans. Studying this legal
regime in comparative Atlantic perspective, from the primary base of British
abolition (Sierra Leone) and the primary mid-century target (south-eastern
Brazil) unearths common problems of defining and regulating jurisdiction.
This approach helps us to rethink the relationship between jurisdiction and
regulation, the interactions between British imperial agents and local political
authorities, and the possibilities for liberated Africans in a world of
competing political formations in the nineteenth century. Central to these
problems were the overlapping patterns of explosive inter-polity violence
and negotiated value exchange.
T H E C A S E F O R C OM PA R I S O N
The Upper Guinea and Brazilian coasts were part of a shared Atlantic world in
the age of abolition. To try to end the transatlantic slave routes in the nineteenth
century, Britain signed bilateral treaties with other slave-trading polities. These
13 On international/inter-polity law, see Jenny S. Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of
International Human Rights Law (Oxford, 2012); Lauren A. Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order:
The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800–1850 (Cambridge, Mass., 2016),
117–31. On the courts as a turning point in European imperialism in Africa, see Richard L.
Roberts and Kristin Mann, “Law in Colonial Africa,” in Kristin Mann and Richard L. Roberts,
eds., Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth, 1991), 3–58, at 10. See, more generally, Edward
Keene, “A Case Study of the Construction of International Hierarchy: British Treaty-Making
against the Slave Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century,” International Organization 61 (2007):
311–39; Derek R. Peterson, ed., Abolitionism and Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and the
Atlantic (Athens, Ohio, 2010); Richard Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in
Victorian Britain (Ithaca, 2012); Bennett Ostdiek and John Fabian Witt, “The Czar and the
Slaves: Two Puzzles in the History of International Arbitration,” American Journal of
International Law 113 (2019): 535–67.
14 See, in particular, Burón v. Denman (1848), 2 Exch 167, 154 ER 450, discussed below. See
also Amanda Perreau-Saussine, “British Acts of State in English Courts,” British Yearbook of
International Law 78 (2008): 176–254. For a recent case, see Rahmatullah (Respondent) v.
Ministry of Defence and Another (Appellants) [2017] UKSC 1, https://www.supremecourt.uk/
cases/docs/uksc-2015-0002-judgment.pdf (last accessed 22 Dec. 2019), pars. 23–24, 26, 37, 65.
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treaties authorized naval captures of slave ships in peacetime and stipulated that
local governments should apprentice the recaptives as “liberated Africans.” The
treaties were enforced by bilateral courts of mixed commission, staffed by one
commissary judge and one commissioner of arbitration from each cosignatory.
Branches of the court sat in Freetown and inside the territory of a cosignatory,
such as Rio de Janeiro. Recaptured Africans, slave ship crews, naval crews,
agents of law, and diplomats thus interacted with the mixed-commission
courts on both coasts. But in the 1820s and 1830s, the navy struggled to
adhere to treaty exemptions, such as lawful Portuguese slave-trading south
of the equator. Moreover, the governments of polities that still permitted
slave ownership, including Brazil, Cuba, and the United States, were
reluctant to enforce anti-slave-trade law.15
The Palmerston Act of 1839 (2 & 3 Vict., c. 73) attempted to resolve the
problems of complexity and hesitant enforcement by authorizing naval captures
of Portuguese ships and other slave ships south of the equator, adjudicated by
vice-admiralty courts in British territories. The Aberdeen Act of 1845 (8 & 9
Vict., c. 122) applied similar rules to the Brazilian slave trade. The result of
these Acts, as well as the treaties that preceded them, was that Sierra Leone
received the largest number of liberated Africans between 1807 and the end
of the transatlantic slave trade in 1867. Brazil was the principal target of
British anti-slave-trade actions between 1839 and 1851 and subject to
intensive pressure until 1864.16 The Upper Guinea and Brazilian coasts,
particularly in and around Freetown and Rio, were therefore sites of crucial
anti-slave-trade legal regulation.
There were important differences between the two coastal regions in the
nineteenth century. The economy of the Upper Guinea Coast revolved
around caravan trade routes. Caravans brought cattle, cloth, and shea butter
from inland polities to coastal polities to exchange for kola, salt, and rice.17
In contrast, the economy of Rio was geared toward maritime trade,
especially in importing captives and exporting slave-produced coffee and
sugar. The surge in global demand for these commodities meant that the
importation of captives to Brazil remained high in the 1830s and 1840s,
despite a legislative attempt to outlaw the slave trade in 1831 (briefly
enforced until 1837).
15 Leslie Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade
Question, 1807–1869 (Cambridge, UK, 1970); Tâmis Parron, “The British Empire and the
Suppression of the Slave Trade to Brazil: A Global History Analysis,” Journal of World History
29 (2018): 1–36.
16 Daniel Domingues da Silva, David Eltis, Philip Misevich, and Olatunji Ojo, “The Diaspora of
Africans Liberated from Slave Ships in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of African History 55
(2014): 347–69; Beatriz Mamigonian, Africanos livres: A abolição do tráfico de escravos no
brasil (São Paulo, SP, 2017).
17 Walter Rodney, A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545–1800 (Oxford, 1970), 226.
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Relations between slaveowners and slaves were also different on each
coast, although there was great variety in work conditions, mobility, kin
incorporation, and routes to manumission. In Rio, slaveowners often hired
out enslaved men, who sometimes earned wages. A customary right
permitted them to save some of their earnings for self-purchase.18 Enslaved
women often worked in domestic service. On the Upper Guinea Coast, the
supply of captives through warfare or judicial punishment intensified to
satisfy markets in the Americas. When that demand slowed after 1807,
captors reassigned captives to work on rice plantations.19 Although Sierra
Leone was a “province of freedom,” it was surrounded by societies which
had increased their use of slave labor in the nineteenth century. Within these
differences in economies and enslavement practices, both coasts underwent
an expansion in slave-ownership for commodity production between 1807
and 1839.
In jurisdictional terms, the similarities between the coasts were more
important than their differences. They shared not only the anti-slave-trade
legal patchwork but also sociopolitical practices that limited British
diplomacy. On the Upper Guinea Coast, British officials were required to act
within the constraints imposed by African chiefs. One common institution
was the “Poro,” a society for initiates that connected gods, spirits, and the
living, advised chiefly political authority, dispensed justice, and regulated
trade and conflict.20 The institution could also declare a “Poro,” forbidding
white travelers and other outsiders from entering certain regions.
In 1836, the traveler F. Harrison Rankin noted that the Temne had declared
a “Poro” forbidding outsiders from venturing further east than Magbelly on the
Rokel river, on pain of capital punishment.21 This prohibitory practice meant
that African rulers considered Britain’s colonial officers in Freetown
irrelevant to their own affairs. Rankin recounted that the ruling Caulkers of
Sherbro (descendants from the seventeenth-century marriage of a Sherbro
princess to a Royal African Company agent) had recently organized a
military expedition several miles north. The force razed the town of Rokel
18 Mary C. Karasch, Slave Life in Rio De Janeiro, 1808–1850 (Princeton, 1987).
19 Ismail Rashid, “‘ADevotion to the Idea of Liberty at Any Price’: Rebellion and Antislavery in
the Upper Guinea Coast in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in Sylviane A. Diouf, ed.,
Fighting the Slave Trade: West African Strategies (Athens, Oh, 2003), 132–51.
20 Kenneth Little, “The Political Function of the Poro. Part I,” Africa 35 (1965): 349–65;
Kenneth Little, “The Political Function of the Poro. Part II,” Africa 36 (1966), 62–72. On
contemporary uses of Poro by Sherbro people, see Anaïs Ménard, “Poro Society, Migration, and
Political Incorporation on the Freetown Peninsula, Sierra Leone,” in Christian Kordt Højbjerg,
Jacqueline Knorr, and William P. Murphy, eds., Politics and Policies in Upper Guinea Coast
Societies: Change and Continuity (New York, 2017), 29–51. On elite political authority in the
Sierra Leone region, see Allen M. Howard and David E. Skinner, “Network Building and
Political Power in Northwestern Sierra Leone, 1800–65,” Africa 54, 2 (1984): 2–28, at 2.
21 F. Harrison Rankin, The White Man’s Grave, 2 vols. (London, 1836), vol. II, 220, 302.
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(opposite Magbelly) to the ground, with “the greater part of its people captured
and sold as slaves.”22 The force had bypassed the colony’s modest borders with
ease (see Map 1).
In Rio, the sociopolitical limitations on British monitoring were less
severe, but still unsettling. In April 1839, the court of mixed commission
was due to adjudicate the capture of the Brazilian ship Ganges, captured
with 419 Africans on board. However, soon after the trial began, a mob
helped the captain of the Ganges escape by pelting the court’s marshals with
stones. Several hundred people surrounded the courthouse and interrupted
the trial.23 The chief of police, Eusébio de Queirós, managed to quell the
mob, but on 7 May, three men attacked two British sailors who were part of
the naval patrol stationed at Rio.24
On both coasts, courts reclassified captives as liberated Africans in regions
which resisted British imperial encroachment and where slave-ownership was
still the norm. The reclassification processes, local elites’ defense of their
polity’s jurisdiction, and the limitations to British diplomacy, created similar
problems regarding anti-slave-trade law on the Upper Guinea and Brazilian
coasts, illuminating more general patterns in the Atlantic world.
J U R I S D I C T I O N A L C H A L L E N G E S : T H E C O U RT S O F M I X E D C OMM I S S I O N
The main source of jurisdictional tension regarding anti-slave-trade law was the
legality of captures. The commissary judges’ principal source of law for
deciding cases was the particular convention between the two contracting
parties. They also referred to ad hoc modifications sent by their respective
governments; no guides or handbooks were published to assist them in their
interpretative work.25 Determining legality required deciding whether the
capture occurred within the geographical limits stipulated by treaties. The
difficulties posed by geography were apparent from the beginning, as
demonstrated by the captures of the Brazilian slavers Activo and Perpetuo
Defensor, adjudicated at Freetown in 1826. The applicable treaty, adapted by
22 Ibid., 253, 259. On captivity and slaving raids between Sherbro and the region between the
Mellacori and Scarcies rivers, see Carol P. MacCormack, “Wono: Institutionalized Dependency
in Sherbro Descent Groups (Sierra Leone),” in Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, eds., Slavery
in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives (Madison, 1977), 181–203, at 193, 195.
23 British Commissioners to Palmerston, 24 Apr. 1839, FO 129/8, UK National Archives
(hereafter UKNA). Police report to Minister of Justice, 21 and 26 Apr. 1839, IJ6 191, Ofícios,
Secretaria da Polícia da Corte, Arquivo Nacional Rio de Janeiro (hereafter ANRJ); Jennifer
Nelson, “Liberated Africans in the Atlantic World: The Courts of Mixed Commission in Havana
and Rio de Janeiro 1819–1871” (Ph.D. thesis, Leeds, 2015), 57–59.
24 Manuel Gomes d’Oliveira Campos to Antônio Freitas Dantes, 20 May 1839, encl. in Eusébio
de Queirós to Minister of Justice, 29 May 1839, IJ6 191, ANRJ.
25 See the perceptive comments in the letter by “Audi Alteram Partem,” Jornal do Commercio,
21 Jan. (1839): 2. On the desirability of a “code of instructions” for the judges, see David Turnbull,
Travels in the West: With Notices of Porto Rico, and the Slave Trade (London, 1840), 77–79.
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MAP 1: “The West Coast of Africa Comprising Guinea and the British Possessions….” The Sierra
Leone Colony is outlined in bold, on the coast in the center of the map with its name underlined.
Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; together with the minutes of
evidence, appendix, and index. Part II—Appendix and Index (1842), paper 551, map follows
p. 520. Source: Image from ProQuest’s House of Commons Parliamentary Papers displayed
with permission of ProQuest LLC.
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newly independent Brazil from the 1815 treaty between Britain and Portugal,
limited naval captures to the high seas north of the equator.26 Both ships had
embarked captives north of the equator, yet had been captured south of it.
The mixed-commission court restored both ships to their respective owners
and awarded damages to them conditional on the approval of the Brazilian
and British governments.
During the adjudication process, the recaptured Africans were left aboard
each slave ship, under quarantine. They revolted and seized boats to escape to
the mainland, effectively ending the crews’ prospects of reclaiming them as
cargo for the restored ships. The court thus referred the verdicts to the Law
Officers in London to determine what precisely was compensable: the death
of recaptives during adjudication, the demurrage incurred by the ship, the
overall loss of captives through revolt and consequent liberation, or nothing
at all. Although the Law Officers struggled to provide a full answer, in both
cases, they authorized the colonial government of Sierra Leone to treat the
captives as liberated Africans. This authorization was not equivalent to
precedent, but judges did not return captives to restored ships after the
infamous Maria da Gloria case in 1833–1834. In that case, 208 of 432
captives (48 percent) died and many were left debilitated after the court in
Rio decided it did not have jurisdiction over a Portuguese ship. The captors
then sent the ship to Freetown, where the court restored the ship to its
owner, allowing a third middle passage to Bahia.
Besides geography and compensation for fugitive recaptives,
jurisdictional tensions arose over the nationality of ships.27 In January 1839,
the court of mixed commission in Rio de Janeiro condemned the Diligente
as a Brazilian slave ship, despite its registered owner being Portuguese. The
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, had argued that the mixed-
commission court’s jurisdiction should extend to include Portuguese ships
because Portugal had refused to renew its anti-slave-trade treaty with Britain.
But given that Brazil had been an independent state since 1822 and Brazilian
and British judges staffed the mixed-commission court, there was no
guarantee that the court would decide to adjudicate the capture as a
“Brazilian” ship.28
The behavior of the Diligente’s owner and captain reveals how slave
traders tried to avoid detection, capture, and adjudication. A Portuguese
26 Emily Haslam, “International Criminal Law and Legal Memories of Abolition: Intervention,
Mixed Commission Courts and ‘Emancipation,’” Journal of the History of International Law /
Revue d’histoire du droit international 18 (2016): 420–47.
27 Most of the reports of adjudications were summative; Martinez, Slave Trade, 74.
28 The court had condemned some Portuguese ships in the 1830s, such as the Amizade Feliz
(1835) and the São Domingos Lucas (1838), but it botched the case of the Flor de Luanda
(1838), restoring the ship but removing some of its captives. Of the 290 recaptured, eighty-five
were apprenticed at the Santa Casa de Misericordia.
A D J U D I C AT I O N , I N T E R V E N T I O N , A N D E X C H A N G E 845
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417520000304
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 81.106.80.232, on 16 Oct 2020 at 11:46:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
resident in Rio, Joaquim Pedro de Freitas, had bought the Diligente in Angola
in August 1837. In July 1838, he arranged a passport from the Governor of
Angola for the ship to sail to Mozambique with a passenger list of
“colonists.” But Pedro de Freitas also instructed the captain to go to Rio de
Janeiro or Montevideo “in case of extreme necessity.” The Electra captured
the Diligente on 1 October, unsurprisingly on a path toward Rio.29
The commissary judges found the claim that the passengers were
“colonists” for Mozambique “specious.” One case report, written in
Portuguese and sent to Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the
“title of colonists cannot deserve the least credit,” and cited the branding on
the Africans’ bodies as proof of the intention to sell them in Brazil.30 The
judges declared the capture lawful, arguing that they were following
Palmerston’s instructions to avoid a repeat of the Maria da Gloria case. That
said, they disagreed about whether the sentence should be binding: the
Brazilian judge insisted that the court permit Pedro de Freitas to lodge an
embargo (appeal).31 The British judge countered that no such domestic
appeal applied to the court, a point the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs
ultimately conceded.32 Tellingly, however, even the Brazilian judge did not
suggest that a successful appeal would involve re-enslaving and re-
embarking the liberated Africans.
As one would expect, the court’s decision angered Rio’s slave traders. The
Diligente’s mate escaped from a local hospital and locals threatened to murder
the captors’ proctor (the legal representative for claiming prize money).33
Between the founding of the mixed-commission courts and the Palmerston
Act in 1839, jurisdictional conflicts emerged through interactions between
judges, local political elites, and British imperial authorities. Jurisdiction
expanded regarding geography and nationality, and recaptives were not re-
embarked in cases of unlawful capture. But the courts left open the questions
29 British Commissioners to Palmerston, 5 Jan. 1839, enclosing case of Diligente,
“Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Surinam on
Slave Trade: 1838–39 (Class A) (Further Series),” 19th Century House of Commons Sessional
Papers, vol. 49, paper 188 (Jan. 1839).
30 Quotation from Comissão Mista (Tráfico de negros), “Correspondência entre a Secretaria de
Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e a Comissário Brasileiro, Recebida, 1839–1840,” letter of 30
Jan. 1839, Lata 52, Maço 2, Arquivo Histórico de Itamaraty (hereafter AHI). On the branding,
see Comissão Mista (Tráfico de negros), Embarcação: Deligente, 1838–1839, statement of
commissary judges, 10 Jan. 1839, Lata 10, Maço 1, Pasta 1, AHI.
31 Statement of Brazilian commissary judge, João Carneiro de Campos, 21 Jan. 1839, Lata 10,
Maço 1, Pasta 1, AHI.
32 Antônio Peregrino Maciel Monteiro to W. G. Ouseley, 14 Feb. 1839, “Correspondence with
Foreign Powers on Slave Trade, 1838–39 (Class B) (Further Series),” 19th Century House of
Commons Sessional Papers, vol. 49, paper 189 (Jan. 1839), p. 137.
33 British Commissioners to Palmerston, 26 Jan. 1839. “Correspondence with British Coms. at
Sierra Leone, Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Surinam on Slave Trade: 1838–39,” (Class A) (Further
Series).
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of how their jurisdiction related to sovereign spaces, the legality of captures in
territorial waters rather than on the high seas, and eventual compensation for
unlawful captures.
C O E R C I V E I N T E RV E N T I O N
After adjudication, liberated Africans lived and worked in areas near the courts.
In Brazil and on the Upper Guinea Coast outside the Sierra Leone Colony, they
were outside British jurisdiction. Although anti-slave-trade treaties specified
certain conditions for liberated Africans during apprenticeship, they did not
stipulate how to regulate these conditions. Nor did the treaties attribute to
liberated Africans status as local subjects or citizens. For African and
Brazilian political elites, liberated Africans were often an extraneous
inconvenience. The lack of enforcement mechanisms thus raised the crucial
question of what responsibilities nearby British agents such as colonial
administrators, naval officers, and diplomats had toward liberated Africans.
This was precisely the problem that Tom Peters, William Mering, and John
Sharp raised in 1844 in their testimony about Louis’s slave-trading activities
in Sherbro and the capture of the Engañador.
When the Lieutenant-Governor of Sierra Leone, William Fergusson,
received copies of the testimony, he calculated that Louis had mistreated the
three men inside the jurisdiction of Harry Tucker, chief of Little Boom
River. Fergusson exemplified how “men-on-the-spot” forged careers out of
anti-slave-trade activity: born mixed-race in Jamaica in the 1790s, he had
won promotion to the rank of staff surgeon in the Royal African Colonial
Corps in 1825. He worked as a civilian surgeon for the Liberated African
Department with responsibility for the health of newly arrived liberated
Africans in the 1820s, and was commissioned as lieutenant-governor in
1841.34 Fergusson applied the same combination of anti-slave-trade zeal,
practical knowledge (or undimmed self-confidence) in how to negotiate with
chiefs, and willingness to use military force when communicating with Chief
Tucker.
Fergusson decided that Tucker’s response to his demands for explanations
and redress were insufficient. On 20 January 1845, he wrote to naval
Commodore William Jones, explaining that the three men were enslaved
while pursuing an “innocent and lawful calling,” and that Louis had willfully
ignored their protests.35 “The legitimate trade of this neighborhood, and the
34 On Fergusson’s background and career, see Christopher Fyfe, “Fergusson, William (1795?–
1846), Physician and Colonial Governor,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford,
2009). On anti-slave trade imperial careers in early Sierra Leone, see Padraic X. Scanlan,
Freedom’s Debtors: British Antislavery in Sierra Leone in the Age of Revolution (New Haven,
2017).
35 Lieutenant-Governor William Fergusson to Commodore William Jones, 20 Jan. 1845, encl.
(mislabelled 20 Dec. 1845); Fergusson to Harry Tucker, 28 Dec. 1844, “Correspondence with
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personal safety of Her Majesty’s subjects, are in a state of constant jeopardy by
those very outrageous and illegal practices,” he wrote, and authorized Jones to
intervene violently against the chiefs.36
Fergusson and Jones’s actions only make sense in the context of slaving
on the Upper Guinea Coast from the eighteenth century onwards. As Walter
Rodney and Paul Lovejoy have demonstrated, the abolition of the maritime
slave trade led to a glut of captives along the trade routes of the Upper
Guinea Coast.37 As the market for sale to Europeans on the coast contracted,
slave traders among the Fula, Susu, and Mandinka found other uses for the
people they had captured or bought.38 In particular, they enslaved the
captives to cultivate rice on plantations and housed them in towns separated
from the free population, called runde in Fula.39
These changes in slave-holding brought changes in modes of resistance.
As Ismail Rashid has argued, rebellions by captives were rejections of
plantation labor and the ideological justifications for enslavement. Rashid
cites two key cases to demonstrate changing modes of resistance. First, in
1785, those enslaved by the Mandinka had allied with Susu warriors, who
were fighting their masters, and together they took over the town of
Yangakori. The town became a “counter to the runde.”40 It took the
Mandinka ten years to recapture the town and destroy the fugitive
settlement.41 Second, in 1838, the slave Bilali, the son of an enslaved
woman and a Susu king, led a rebellion after the king’s heirs reneged on a
promise to manumit him. He successfully established an independent
settlement among the Limba, at Laminyah, that became a refuge for fugitives
until 1870.42
British imperial agents based in Sierra Leone, such as Fergusson and
Jones, were thus acting with an anti-slave-trade mandate at a time of rapid
British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope, Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd
Islands; Reports from British Vice-Admiralty Courts and Naval Officers on Slave Trade: 1845
(Class A),” pp. 34–37.
36 Note that, despite Fergusson’s turn of phrase, the status of liberated Africans as “subjects,”
was not clarified by Parliament until 1853. Bronwen Everill, “Experiments in Colonial
Citizenship in Sierra Leone and Liberia,” in Beverly C. Tomek and Matthew J. Hetrick, eds.,
New Directions in the Study of African American Recolonization (Gainesville, 2017), 185–205.
37 Rodney, History of the Upper Guinea Coast; Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A
History of Slavery in Africa (Cambridge, UK, 2011).
38 See the decline in slaves purchased for the transatlantic trade: Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic
Slave Trade Database, at http://slavevoyages.org/voyages/Zed7r2xr (last accessed 11 Sept. 2018).
39 Rodney, History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 261.
40 Rashid, “Devotion,” 139.
41 Thomas Masterman Winterbottom, An Account of the Native Africans in the Neighbourhood
of Sierra Leone: To Which Is Added an Account of the Present State of Medicine among Them
(London, 1803), 155, 157.
42 Rashid, “Devotion,” 146.
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change in slaving and slave resistance on the Upper Guinea Coast. These
changes generated contradictory impulses for British agents. On one hand,
Sierra Leone was often dependent on rice cultivated by slaves in other
polities as a major source of subsistence, and so British agents were reluctant
to start conflicts with African polities.43 On the other, the rapid changes
made visible several instances of slave-holding of dubious legitimacy,
whether on the terms of African polities’ jurisdiction or of anti-slave-trade
treaties’ regulations regarding liberated Africans.
In fact, Jones’s intervention was not the first major British extrajudicial
action on the Upper Guinea Coast. Retracing the pattern reveals the
contradiction between extending British responsibilities to liberated Africans
and limiting those responsibilities to respect the jurisdiction of African
chiefs. In November 1838, Lieutenant Arthur Kellet landed on the island of
Bolama. Portugal claimed imperial sovereignty over Bolama, exercised
through the governor of Bissão, which was opposite the island. In the 1830s,
Governor Caetano Nozolini used the island as a holding pen for slaves
employed in porterage and agricultural commerce with the mainland. He also
used it to accommodate slaves for sale into the transatlantic trade.44
However, Britain also claimed sovereignty over Bolama, having allegedly
agreed to its cession from the Bissagos—the local residents—as part of an
ill-fated colonization scheme in 1792. The British revived their claim in a
treaty with the kings of Bolama and “Biafres” in 1827.45 Consequently, in
1838, Kellet symbolically removed Portugal’s flag, replaced it with Britain’s,
and transferred 206 slaves to HMS Brisk to be freed by the vice-admiralty
court at Freetown.
Kellet’s actions exposed the contradiction between Britain’s claim to
sovereignty over Bolama and the free soil principle that operated inside
British colonies. The Slave Trade Act 1824 (5 Geo. IV c. 113 §22)
authorized judicial adjudication of prize slaves as prizes of war for “the
Purpose only of divesting and barring all other Property, Right, Title, or
Interest whatever [regarding them].”46 A judicial verdict that a capture was
lawful removed all property rights from the captives, thereby creating a legal
tabula rasa. However, Chief Justice Robert Rankin, judge of the Vice-
Admiralty Court, pointed out that if Bolama was under British sovereignty
43 Philip R. Misevich, “‘On the Frontier of Freedom’: Abolition and the Transformation of
Atlantic Commerce in Southern Sierra Leone, 1790s to 1860s” (PhD diss., Emory University,
2009); Scanlan, Freedom’s Debtors.
44 Walter Hawthorne, Planting Rice and Harvesting Slaves: Transformations along the Guinea-
Bissau Coast, 1400–1900 (Portsmouth, 2003), 183–84.
45 “Biafres” likely referred to the Biafada people. Reply to Portuguese memorial, 26 Nov. 1869,
CO 879/2/17, UKNA.
46 Slave Trade Act 1824, 5 Geo. IV c. 113, §22, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo4/5/
113/enacted (last accessed 10 Feb. 2020).
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by treaty before Kellet’s actions, any slave who set foot there became free by
common law through the free soil principle. A judge had no authority to
adapt or add to that freedom through the application of a parliamentary
statute. There could be no rights, title, or interest to remove, and so the court
had no authority to declare the “slaves” free.
Kellet fretted about his diminishing prospects of prize money, and
Governor Richard Doherty worried about how to manage a population that
now existed in a legally ambiguous zone. The extant official documents
focused on prize money, occluding what happened to the recaptives. The
Liberated African Department probably sent them to Freetown or its
surrounding villages as apprentices, applying the same methods as with
restored slave ships.47 Kellet’s violent action had freed more captives, but had
further confused the boundaries between anti-slave-trade jurisdiction, British
imperial claims to jurisdiction, and African and Portuguese sovereign authorities.
Two years later, in the late rainy season of 1840, Captain Joseph Denman
raided Spanish slave traders at Gallinas, south of Sherbro.48 Denman’s mission
aimed to resolve two cases. First, King Siaka of Gendema had protested against
the navy’s blockade of the Gallinas ports, which prevented the chiefs from
trading for subsistence grains with Sherbro and the Plantain Islands. In a
letter to Doherty, signed by Siaka and the powerful Rogers family but
possibly drafted by Spanish slave traders, the rulers stated that “although we
are Africans,” the “law of Nations” still applied: it was unlawful for the
British navy to blockade a foreign port in peacetime.49
Second, in September 1840, a liberated African woman from Sierra Leone,
Fry Norman, was detained in Gendema.50 Norman was a washerwoman who had
tracked her employer, a Mr. Lewis, to the Gallinas for repayment of a debt.
Unfortunately for Norman, her former hirer during her apprenticeship owed
money to King Siaka’s son, Prince Manna, who detained Norman as security.51
There was an elision between Norman as liberated African, debt pawn, captive,
independent creditor, and incorporated member of her former hirer’s kin.
Since liberated Africans in Sierra Leone were not attributed British
subjecthood until 1853, the governor had no formal obligation to negotiate
Norman’s release. But in October, Governor Doherty ordered Denman to
rescue Norman, using force if necessary. Denman negotiated the rescue,
47 Doherty to Colonial Office, 4 Feb. 1839, despatch and enclosures, especially no. 7: Rankin to
Doherty, 16 Jan. 1839, CO 267/152, UKNA.
48 Doherty to Colonial Office, 4 Jan. 1841, CO 267/163, UKNA.
49 King Siaka and the Rogers family to Doherty, n.d. [ca. Sept. 1840], encl. in Doherty to
Russell, 7 Dec. 1840, CO 267/160, UKNA.
50 Identified as “Try Norman” in some sources.
51 Fry Norman to Joseph Norman, 6 Sept. 1840; Fry Norman to Rosanna Gray, 8 Sept. 1840;
William Fergusson to Doherty, 9 Oct. 1840; all enclosed in Doherty to Russell, 7 Dec. 1840,
CO 267/160.
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burned the barracoons of a Spanish slave trader, and liberated 841 slaves in
Freetown. He also negotiated—or rather, extracted—anti-slave-trade treaties
with Siaka and Manna, even though neither Doherty nor the Foreign Office
had authorized him to do so.52 The resolution of Norman’s complex and
vulnerable status was re-entry into Sierra Leone and the use of coercion to
extend anti-slave-trade treaty law.
In light of Kellet and Denman’s actions, the case of Peters, Mering, and
Sharp from 1845 followed a pattern of intervention. Commodore Jones went
to Gallinas to demand redress and promises from local chiefs about the
future good treatment of liberated Africans. On 4 February, Jones entered
Gallinas with 286 men and burned the barracoon of the slave trader “Angel
Jimenes [sic],” who had admitted to branding Peters before putting him on
the slave ship Engañador. Jones ordered the destruction of the towns Tindes,
Taillah, and Minah to teach the ruling Rogers family a lesson.53 Three locals
were killed and fourteen wounded. Over the next three weeks, Jones
negotiated with, cajoled, and threatened the Gallinas chiefs until they made
reparations and pledges, in an extended, multifaceted debate about British
imperial and African understandings of anti-slave-trade law.
Initially, the African chiefs denied that the anti-slave-trade treaties they
had signed with Denman in 1840 obliged them to expel all Spanish slave
traders from their territories. They even claimed that Denman had compelled
them to sign the treaties at gunpoint, thereby voiding them.54 Next, Jones
and the chiefs disagreed about the boundaries between, and mutual
intelligibility of, British and chiefly jurisdiction. Regarding the punishment
of Elizabeth Eastman, who had tried to save Tom Peters from the slave
traders, Chief Harry Tucker insisted that the flogging was sanctioned by the
“country laws” which applied to all residents of his chiefdom.55 Prince
Manna, accused by Mering of selling him as a slave, asked Jones for what
he described as a “jury” trial, namely that Mering accuse him in person in
Gendema.56 Finally, Jones and the chiefs disagreed over the process of
52 Although the Queen’s Advocate in the Foreign Office advised that Denman’s destruction of a
Spanish subject’s property was a violation of the law of nations, a judge eventually ruled in 1848
that he could not be held personally accountable for an action approved of by the British
Government, hence forming a statement of “act of state” doctrine.
53 The incident provides the guiding metaphor for Huzzey, Freedom Burning, Prologue.
54 Rogers family to William Jones, 26 Jan. 1845; Prince Manna to William Jones, 6 Feb. 1845,
“Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope, Jamaica,
Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands; Reports from British Vice-Admiralty Courts and Naval Officers
on Slave Trade: 1845 (Class A),” 40, 54.
55 Harry Tucker to William Jones, 3 Feb. 1845, “Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra
Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope, Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands; Reports from
British Vice-Admiralty Courts and Naval Officers on Slave Trade: 1845 (Class A),” 44.
56 Prince Manna, Lusinia Rogers, J. S. Rogers, and James Weston to William Jones, 14 Feb.
1845, “Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope,
Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands; Reports from British Vice-Admiralty Courts and Naval
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redress. When the chiefs asked if they should seek payment from the Spanish
slave traders to pay compensation to Jones, the commodore refused. The Lord
Commissioners of the Admiralty had previously demanded an explanation
from Denman for a similar strategy, perhaps because it had involved the
transfer of goods from a slave trader to the chiefs, and therefore exposed the
navy to an accusation of perpetuating the commercial relationships of the
transatlantic slave trade. Extrajudicial violence, the normativity of treaties,
mutual respect for municipal (internal) jurisdictions, and the use of goods to
compensate unlawful detention informed how African and British authorities
determined anti-slave-trade jurisdiction in the 1840s.
On 24 February, the chiefs refused to sign a new treaty, but agreed in
principle to pay compensation. Jones spared Gendema from being razed to
the ground to remind the chiefs that they had something to lose. A
compensation payment of ten slaves, half of the value paid in muskets,
powder, a cutlass, tobacco, and cloth, was unacceptable because the British
government “cannot regard human beings as the subject or the representation
of pecuniary value; as such, therefore, those goods and those five persons
cannot be received.”57
By June, Harry Tucker had paid compensation to Eastman (subject to the
approval of the Navy and governor), who in fact had survived her ordeal, in the
form of iron bars, cloth, and the liberation of five slaves who were sent to
Freetown.58 Instigated by liberated Africans’ testimony, naval violence
against riverine chiefs had produced compensation in the shape of more
freed slaves. But the price was intensified legal conflict between the colony
and neighboring chiefs over the responsibilities, jurisdiction, and
enforceability of anti-slave-trade law.
In one sense, Jones’s coercive actions seemed more severe than Kellet’s in
Bolama or Denman’s in Gallinas: he destroyed towns rather than flags or
barracoons and used a larger number of men to do so. But in another sense,
Jones’s use of violence was primarily a theatrical show of force and did not
Officers on Slave Trade: 1845 (Class A),” p. 55. Manna’s request does not strictly equate to legal
pluralism, or to Britain’s exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, because neither he nor the colonial
government thought that British and chiefly modes of dispute resolution applied to the same
jurisdiction at the same time. Manna was not asking that British law be inserted into his
jurisdiction, but rather for a “jury trial” on his terms in front of an audience of his subjects.
57 William Raymond to anonymous, 26 Mar. 1845; Fergusson to Chief Sy-Cummah, 27 Mar.
1845, “Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, Cape of Good Hope,
Jamaica, Loanda, and Cape Verd Islands; Reports from British Vice-Admiralty Courts and Naval
Officers on Slave Trade: 1845” (Class A),” p. 82.
58 It was apparently never established whether Eastman had been pregnant and had miscarried.
Jones’s attention shifted to two other women who were subjects of Sierra Leone but resident in
Gendema, who confirmed that they were not enslaved but rather there willingly as the wives of
local men.
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result in the mass removal from African rulers of slaves detained for maritime
trading or for domestic servitude. Tucker’s compensation was, after all, paid
through negotiation rather than seizure or confiscation.
Jones’s actions also revealed the limits of British imperial authority and
ambition on the Upper Guinea Coast at mid-century. The Navy had the
power required for performative incursions and burnings, but not for
occupation, colonization, or even sustained dialogue. These performances
mattered because there was no guarantee that Portuguese and African
political authorities would recognize Britain’s claims to sovereignty in
Bolama or Sierra Leone.59 Britain’s forces received a timely reminder that
such recognition was never self-evident in May 1855, when a military and
naval expedition went to Malaghea on the Mellacori River. The expedition
of 150 men sought compensation for damage to the property of French and
British traders from the king of Malaghea, Bamba Mina Lahai, and the
chiefs of the Mooriah country. It ended in disaster.60 Although the troops
burned most of the town, thirty men drowned and a further thirty-two were
killed, missing, or taken prisoner. The expedition also violated the king’s
flag of truce.61 The governor, Robert Dougan, was required to abandon the
claim to compensation in exchange for the return of prisoners and the
opening of roads and rivers to British and French traders in a peace treaty
with the king. Ultimately, Dougan was dismissed from office.
Britain continued to defend the claim to sovereignty over Bolama until the
United States decided an arbitration case in favor of Portugal in 1870. Notably,
then, British projections of expanding anti-slave-trade law by force were
primarily calculated at disrupting other European imperial and slave traders’
enclavist, riverine, and archipelagic systems rather than at colonizing or
increasing imperial influence over African chiefs. The regime was only
subject to the authority of the Law Officers or Lord Commissioners of the
Admiralty in ex post facto fashion—Jones sought approval from the
Commissioners on 18 February, fully two months after Peters, Mering, and
Sharp testified to the police magistrate.62
59 On the necessity of an audience’s approval for claims to sovereignty to be successful, see
Danilyn Rutherford, Laughing at Leviathan: Sovereignty and Audience in West Papua (Chicago,
2012).
60 Robert Dougan to Adams, 21 May 1855, “Correspondence Relative to Recent Expeditions
against Moriah Chiefs in Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone,” 19th Century House of Commons
Sessional Papers, vol. 37, paper 1997 (Jan. 1855), pp. 16–19.
61 Lt-Col. L. Smyth O’Connor to C. Yorke, 21 June 1855, “Further Correspondence Relative to
the Recent Expeditions against the Moriah Chiefs in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone (In
continuation of papers presented August 1855),” 19th Century House of Commons Sessional
Papers, vol. 42, paper 2111 (Jan. 1855), pp. 52–54.
62 A similar naval action destroyed barracoons in Ambriz and Cabinda, which contained the
goods (excluding slaves) of the Portuguese slaving merchant Manoel Pinto da Fonseca, who
unsuccessfully sued in British courts for compensation. Rothery subsequently rejected Brazil’s
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As on the Upper Guinea Coast, the presence of liberated Africans in Brazil
created a problem regarding British and Brazilian responsibilities for liberated
Africans under anti-slave-trade law. British intervention in Brazil was not as
spectacularly violent as on the Upper Guinea Coast, but it was similarly
coercive. By 1845, the mixed-commission court in Rio had processed 4,785
liberated Africans, creating paper trails regarding their identification and
apprenticeship.63 But that year, Brazil refused to sign another anti-slave-trade
treaty to extend the court’s jurisdiction beyond its initial fifteen-year term.64
In the years before the court’s closure, the judges had tried to hold
Brazilian authorities accountable for the treatment of apprenticed liberated
Africans. The Anglo-Brazilian treaty did not specify sanctions against either
party for abusing liberated Africans, and so the only option for judges was to
notify British diplomats who might then exert pressure on the Brazilian
government. For example, in November 1843, the British commissioner
alleged that administrators treated apprentices with “cruelty” inside the Casa
de Correção, the first modern prison in Brazilian history. Such complaints
were nothing new: Casa workers and convicts had famously petitioned the
Emperor himself regarding their dismal work conditions in 1841.65 However,
by the time the Foreign Office raised the allegation with Brazil, the court
was due to close, which allowed officials to delay responding to it.66
Brazilian officials responded in October 1845. The Casa’s administrator of
public works, Thomé Joaquim Torres, wrote to the Minister of Justice flatly
denying that the liberated Africans had suffered in terms of diet, illness, or
overwork. Probably in full knowledge that there was no mixed-commission
court to verify his report, he generously mentioned that “this Casa, and all its
attempt to include the claim in the Anglo-Brazilian claims commission. See Comissão Mista
(Tráfico de escravos), Embarcação: John A. Robb, 1830–1860, Lata 19, Maço 1, AHI; H. C.
Rothery to Earl Granville, 8 Feb. 1871, in Confidential 2656, pt. II, Correspondence Respecting
Anglo-Brazilian Claims, 1867–75, FO 420/25, p. 61.
63 The figure is from Robert Conrad, “Neither Slave nor Free: The Emancipados of Brazil,
1818–1868,” Hispanic American Historical Review 53 (1973): 50–70, at 54; Mamigonian,
Africanos Livres.
64 The court formally closed in September 1845, six months after the fifteenth anniversary of the
enforcement of Brazil’s anti-slave trade treaty with Britain, to allow the court to deal with any
ongoing cases. Britain’s right of search of Brazilian ships strictly should have ended in
September 1845, though it remained a matter of debate and Brazil’s Conselho de Estado could
not reach a verdict on whether to insist on the end of the right of search. “Conselho de Estado,
1845, Consulta de 20 de setembro sobre a cessação do direito de visita e busca que tinha a
Inglaterra a consequência do tráfico de escravos,” 342/1/4, AHI.
65 “Requerimento dos presos sentenciados a serviço da Casa de Correção a S.M.I.…” [1841], II-
34,25,011, Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro.
66 Antônio Paulino Limpo de Abreu (Minister of Justice) to Inspector of Works, 23 Oct. 1845,
IIIJ7 139, Obras da Casa de Correção, Avisos, 1841–1849, ANRJ.
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accommodation, are open to anybody who might like to visit them.”67 Indeed,
“the Africans have demonstrated great enjoyment in the occupations to which
they have been assigned,” both inside the Casa and working for private hirers.
Torres also enclosed two tables as proof. The first described the daily diet of
the liberated Africans: dried meat, beans, farinha, rice, and bacon.68 The second
laid out the occupations of the liberated Africans, including stonemasonry,
construction, carpentry, and blacksmithing. Professed transparency and
schematic tables were scripted responses to complaints about the Casa.
British officials had no way of verifying Torres’s report. The principal
channel for gathering information, the British judge on the mixed-commission
court, no longer existed. As an alternative way to sustain pressure on Brazil to
end the slave trade, parliament passed the Aberdeen Act in August 1845, to
continue naval captures. The Act increased distrust in Brazil regarding British
actions and motives. By replacing the mediating effect of the mixed
commission with aggressive unilateral action, British politicians uprooted the
assumption that abolition was based on consent (even if that consent was
often a façade). The only option now available to British politicians for
monitoring liberated Africans was to use local diplomats in Rio.
In 1849, having realized that some apprenticeships had expired, the British
chargé d’affaires in Brazil, James Hudson, ordered Robert Hesketh, the consul at
Rio, to compile a report on all the liberated Africans he could trace there. Hudson
hoped to use the report to agree on a protocol with the Brazilian government to
sanction shipments of liberated Africans to a British colony or to Liberia (as a
neutral alternative). It took Hesketh over two years to compile the data on 856
liberated Africans who had been apprenticed after liberation by the mixed-
commission court. He listed their occupations and workplaces and commented
on their lives or work conditions. The protocol ultimately failed, but Hesketh’s
survey became a focal point for liberated African protest.69
In August 1850, perhaps aware that Hesketh was interviewing their fellow
apprentices, several liberated Africans in the Casa wrote to him begging him to
facilitate their release. They complained of their “disgrace” at having served
nineteen years as apprentices rather than the stipulated fourteen.70 In
November, they wrote again, raising the tempo:
67 Thomé Joaquim Torres to Limpo de Abreu, 28 Oct. 1845, IJ7 10, Casa de Correção, Ofícios:
Africanos, 1834–1848, ANRJ.
68 “Tabella do fornecimento para os africanos q. existem na Caza de Correção,” first encl. in
Serva to Abreu, 28 Oct. 1845, IJ7 10, ANRJ.
69 Hudson to Palmerston, 11 Dec. 1851, and encl. “Correspondence with British Ministers and
Agents in Foreign Countries, and with Foreign Ministers in England, on Slave Trade, 1851–52
(Class B),” 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, pt. II.1, paper 0.3 (Jan. 1853),
pp. 324–26.
70 “Africanos de Caza de Correcao [sic]” to Robert Hesketh, 9 Aug. 1850, FO 131/7, pt. 2,
UKNA.
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To Mr Consul
The most worthy Excellency, we implore you that we might hope to lay at the feet of
Your Excellency to know the second decision of Your Excellency and because in the
hand of Your Excellency we hope to reach some hope, that we are disregarded and
therefore we seek and ask Your Excellency to send us with all certainty to Your
Excellency to know well we are slaves until death in this House of Correction if like
this we wish to know we bless the hand of Your Excellency as father of humanity.
The Africans of the House of Correction
23 of November 1850.71
The letter-cum-petition emphasizes the uncertain status of the liberated
Africans. They were out of sight—“disregarded”—yet knew that they were
visible to British diplomats. They collectively realized that they had no way
to hold the administrators of the Casa to account, but that the diplomats had
the authority to criticize them. This lack of power but access to authority led
to the double qualification: “we hope to reach some hope.” The petitioners
ended their address by praising Hesketh as fictive kin, as a “father” who
represented “humanity.” This term translated their particular material and
political objectives into an apparently moralistic register, above the level of
inter-imperial diplomacy, yet the authors hoped that those same diplomatic
mechanisms would remedy their situation.72 The Africans had combined a
tradition of Casa protest with the language of moral obligation and their
unusual inter-polity leverage.
Hesketh’s survey and the Casa petition were potentially explosive. Like
Peters, Mering, and Sharp’s testimony at Freetown, the liberated Africans
complained about captivity and abuse, drawing local British diplomatic
attention to their plight. But unlike that case, there was no direct coercive
response and Hesketh quietly filed the petition inside his handwritten survey,
to be classified as a miscellaneous extra in the consulate’s archive. Why did
the petition elicit so little attention?
Ten months previously, in January 1850, the British vessel Cormorant had
captured the slaver Santa Cruz inside Brazilian waters, at São Sebastião, after it
71 “S. Illmo Emo Senhr Conçal. O bem digno es pés de V.Ea no vem emplorar a fim de que
esperamos por isso que nos dirigema aos pés de V.Ea por saber a segunda de cizão de V.Ea e
porque nas mão de V.Ea hé aonde espeiremo alcaçar alguma esperacia pq nos es descaso e por
isso que nosso pedimos e rogamos a V.Ea pq nos mande a todo certeza V.Ea nosso saber sem
somos escarvos athe morre nesta [ca]sa de Correcao se assim nosso desejamos as saber pelas
osbedigmo mão de V.Ea como Paij de umanidade. Os affricanos de Caza de Correcão 23 de
novembro de 1850.” Africans to Hesketh, 23 Nov. 1850, FO 131/7, pt. 2, literal transcription. I
thank Cynthia Rocha for helping me to transcribe the petition in Portuguese. This letter is also
quoted in Mamigonian, Africanos Livres, 255–56.
72 Umanidade seems to have been a relatively rare term in contemporary print. For some
illustrative examples in the Press where umanidade refers to equity in the political process and
to liberated Africans’ treatment during apprenticeship, see, respectively, Jornal do Commercio,
25 Aug. 1850: 1; and O Republico, 15 July 1853: 3.
856 J A K E S U B R YA N R I C H A R D S
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417520000304
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 81.106.80.232, on 16 Oct 2020 at 11:46:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
had disembarked approximately seven hundred captives on the coast.73 The
commanding admiral, Reynolds, had ordered the Cormorant’s captain,
Schomberg, to make no further captures within Brazilian waters lest he
breach treaty and parliamentary law. However, the ubiquitous Hudson took a
different view, wishing to use the case as a pressure point. Perhaps he was
enraged by secret intelligence about the Santa Cruz’s crew, who had
suppressed a shipboard conspiracy to revolt by executing the ringleaders.
Perhaps Hudson saw subsequent Brazilian parliamentary protests against the
capture as a sign of weakness.74 He notified Palmerston that the Brazilian
government was prepared to start negotiating a new anti-slave-trade treaty,
and encouraged him to replace cumbersome naval steamers with lighter
Banshee vessels to increase the number of captures along the Brazilian
coast.75 Without the mixed-commission, Hudson envisaged naval patrols that
were no longer limited to the high seas by treaty jurisdiction or diplomatic
conventions.
Hudson’s proposal arrived at an opportune time in Whitehall. By early
1850, an influential parliamentary select committee into the efficacy of naval
suppression had been in full swing for almost two years. It regularly heard
evidence about the failings of abolition policies. One naval surgeon’s
account from his time in Brazil in the 1840s had declared naval suppression
of the Brazilian slave trade a failure.76 William Hutt, the committee’s chair
and an opponent of naval suppression, proposed a parliamentary motion to
withdraw from treaty arrangements that obligated Britain to maintain the
naval squadrons. As Richard Huzzey has demonstrated, Lord John Russell’s
Whig government presented the issue as a vote of confidence in his
administration.77 The government won the vote by 232 votes to 154, but the
strength of opposition threatened to undermine the naval squadrons.78
Following the crucial vote, Russell was under pressure to consolidate
parliamentary and public support for the naval squadrons. The earl of Minto,
a former first lord of the admiralty and close political confidant (and who
had the good fortune to be Russell’s father-in-law), held meetings with
celebrity naval aggressor Denman and a former naval officer turned Whig
MP, Dudley Pelham. Minto confidentially reported that Denman and Pelham
73 Hudson to Palmerston, 20 Feb. 1850, “Correspondence with British Ministers and Agents in
Foreign Countries, and with Foreign Ministers in England, on Slave Trade, 1850–51 (Class B),”
19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, pt. II.1, paper 1424-II (Jan. 1851), pp. 54–56.
74 On the suppression of insurrection, see Jose Joaquim dos Santos to Leopoldo Augusto da
Câmara Lima, 6 Jan. 1850, encl. in Hudson to Palmerston (confidential), 20 Feb. 1850, FO 467/
13, UKNA, p. 49.
75 Hudson to Palmerston (confidential), 3 Feb. 1850, FO 84/801, UKNA, fols. 164–75.
76 T. Nelson, Remarks on the Slavery and Slave Trade of The Brazils (London, 1846), 74.
77 Huzzey, Freedom Burning, 112–14, 120–22.
78 Hansard Debates, 19 Mar. 1850, vol. 109, c1184.
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advocated extensive barracoon raids along the West African shoreline, and
urged Russell to meet them.79 The joint plan, based on Denman’s charts of
slave-trading locales on the West African coast, clearly aimed at suppressing
the Brazilian slave trade by cutting off supply on the other side of the
Atlantic. His collaborator, Pelham, rubbed his hands at the prospect of a
preemptive strike to “defeat the attacks of the Huttites.”80 Russell sanctioned
British naval vessels to seize slave ships inside territorial waters. But there
was a surprise: rather than targeting West Africa, he ordered naval seizures
along the Brazilian coast (see Map 2).
On 22 April, in an explicit vindication of the Cormorant’s capture of the
Santa Cruz, the law officers advised the Admiralty that existing legislation
contained “no Restrictions as to the limits within which the Search,
Detention, and Capture of Slave Traders under the Brazilian flag, or without
any Nationality, are to take place….”81 Such advice ignored customary inter-
polity law that decreed that waters up to three nautical miles from the coast
were sovereign spaces. The Cormorant’s aggression, Hudson’s opportunism,
and Russell’s parliamentary one-upmanship combined to sanction naval
violence.
Upon receiving the new instructions on 22 June, Admiral Reynolds
ordered naval captures inside Brazilian waters and ports. Subsequent cases of
controversial seizure, including by the Sharpshooter at Macaé and the
Cormorant at Paranaguá, sparked violent resistance by locals. A municipal
judge at Paranaguá labeled British actions “verdadeira pirataria” and a
breach of “direito internacional.”82 On 12 July, the Brazilian government
resumed a debate, in secret, in the Câmara (lower chamber) on a bill that
would strengthen criminal penalties against new importations of African
captives. The amended bill became Lei 581 on 4 September.83 Hudson
reported Brazil’s offer to negotiate a new treaty in exchange for revoking the
naval instructions, but also advised the British government to maintain the
pressure.84 The navy captured the Amelia in late 1850 and transferred some
79 Minto to Russell, 25 Mar. 1850, fols. 124A–125, PRO 30/22/8D, UKNA.
80 Pelham to Minto, 25 Mar. 1850, fol. 128v, encl. in ibid. See also the prescient warnings of
Francis Baring to Russell, 30 Mar. 1850, fol. 140v, ibid.
81 Eddisbury to Hamilton, 22 Apr. 1850, fols. 95–96, FO 84/823, UKNA; Benton and Ford,
Rage for Order, 130.
82 Filastrio Nunes Pires to Schomberg, 30 June 1850, fols. 206v, 207r, FO 84/804, UKNA.
83 Lei 581 (1850). For the text, see https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/leimp/1824-1899/lei-
581-4-setembro-1850-559820-publicacaooriginal-82230-pl.html (last accessed 13 Dec. 2019). See
also Jeffrey D Needell, “The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade in 1850: Historiography, Slave
Agency and Statesmanship,” Journal of Latin American Studies 33 (2001), 681–711, esp. 707–11;
Tâmis Peixoto Parron, “A política da escravidão no império do Brasil, 1826–1865” (Dissertação de
Mestrado, Universidade de São Paulo, 2009), 187.
84 Further evidence of the shift from British-Brazilian jurisdictional negotiation and oversight
from the imperial metropole to local discretionary political power is evident in Reynolds’s
willingness to heed Hudson’s advice to suspend the naval captures inside Brazilian waters in
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MAP 2: “Chart of the Coast of Brazil fromMaranham [sic] to the River Plate” (J. Arrowsmith, 1850). The red dots indicate where slavers landed their cargoes and
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recaptives to British colonies in the Caribbean.85 Nonetheless, as Brazil’s
enforcement of its municipal anti-slave-trade law improved, the British
diplomatic-naval nexus transformed from coastal aggressor to intelligence
supplier to Brazil, until the closing of the Brazilian slave trade in 1856.
British priorities had thus shifted from protecting liberated Africans to
violent coastal naval policing. The difference between the coercive response
to the plight of Peters, Mering, and Sharp in Sherbro and the diplomatic
indifference to the Casa petition in Rio came down to British agents’
increasing disillusionment with the Brazilian government and domestic
political pressures rather than any perceived “civilizational” difference
between the Brazilian and Upper Guinea Coast polities. Having failed to
attract diplomatic assistance, the Casa Africans continued to work and reside
there, often in deprived conditions, until 1864, when surviving liberated
Africans were emancipated from apprenticeships in Brazil. The local
discretionary power of British diplomats such as Hudson and naval crews
such as the Cormorant’s were thus central to explaining how and why
abolition switched from diplomatic monitoring to naval violence. Crucially,
for histories of the abolition of the Brazilian slave trade, it was not so much
jurists’ symbolic capital that underpinned anti-slave-trade jurisdiction as the
changing evidentiary primacy regarding where sovereign responsibility to
combat illegal slave-trading lay: from apprenticeship work conditions to
coastal slaving practices.
VA L U E E X C H A NG E
Coercive violence was one dimension of regulating anti-slave-trade law, but it
was only ever possible in short bursts. Even as world hegemon, the British
Empire did not have the personnel, firepower, epidemiological knowledge,
or domestic support to launch full-scale invasions of the Brazilian and Upper
Guinea Coasts. Imperial officers needed to resolve conflict in ways that
satisfied both anti-slave-trade prerogatives and municipal jurisdictions. On
the Upper Guinea Coast, conflict revolved around cases of liberated Africans
held captive or re-enslaved: How did the Sierra Leone governor and African
chiefs negotiate over them? In Brazil, who had authority to determine the
legality of naval captures after the end of the mixed-commission court,
especially in light of British seizures in Brazil’s territorial waters in 1850?
July. Reynolds was apparently happy to trust in the diplomat’s confidence that a new Brazilian
abolition law was forthcoming rather than await further instruction from the Admiralty;
Reynolds to Hudson, 14 July 1850, FO 84/805, UKNA.
85 Hudson to Palmerston, 10 Oct. 1850, in “Correspondence with British Ministers and Agents
in Foreign Countries, and with Foreign Ministers in England, on Slave Trade, 1850–51 (Class B),”
19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, pt. II.1, paper 0.3 (Jan. 1853), p. 301.
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On the Upper Guinea Coast, formal agreements between Sierra Leone’s
governor and African chiefs in the 1830s and 1840s provided only a partial
resolution to re-enslavement. In 1837, Governor Henry Campbell signed a
Convention with fifteen nearby chiefs to pay them annual stipends in return
for commitments to keep roads open for trade, restrict Poro, and refer any
potential conflict between chiefs to the governor. The chiefs were also obliged
to return any liberated African “enticed away, kidnapped, purchased, or held
for any debt, or pretended claim, and that no satisfaction shall be required”
for the return.86 The governor (or his appointed agent) was authorized to
request the return. Similarly, the governor undertook to return any
“domestics”—those enslaved within the chiefs’ jurisdictions for agricultural
production rather than outside sale—who sought refuge in Freetown.87
Other treaties between the Governor and chiefs farther from Sierra Leone
committed the parties to abolishing the slave trade and treating the “lives and
properties of liberated Africans [as] inviolate.”88 Unlike the Convention, the
treaties did not specify how to return re-enslaved liberated Africans to the
Colony. These conventions and treaties differed from prevailing Upper
Guinean norms of establishing relations between authorities. For instance,
one norm developed through the caravan trade involved gift exchange at the
end of negotiations to recognize chiefs’ respective authority, thereby
combining politics and commerce. The convention and treaties seemed
narrow and inflexible in comparison, and also like stepping-stones to
European territorial annexation.
However, following the treaties from bounded text to situational practice
reveals a very different pattern for resolving re-enslavement. Between 1845 and
1862, the governor wrote dozens of letters to African chiefs about liberated
Africans who were re-enslaved or held captive in their jurisdictions. There
were at least forty negotiations between the governor and chiefs, which
resulted in the return of at least 120 liberated Africans or other British
subjects in total.89 To comply with Poro, Sierra Leone’s black police
constables traveled outside the colony, partly as diplomats and partly to
rescue re-enslaved liberated Africans. They were crucial to the government
for communicating with polities and developing diplomatic relations along
the Upper Guinea Coast and inland.90
86 Convention, 11 Apr. 1837, Article VII, FO 403/484, UKNA, p. 99.
87 Ibid., Article IX.
88 E.g., “Treaty between Commissioners of Lieutenant-Governor William Fergusson and Bey
Sherbro, Chief of the Samo Country, and Morie Bokery, Chief of Moricaryah [sic], 20 May
1845,” Article III, FO 403/484, UKNA, p. 108.
89 I have calculated this number from a close reading of the extant Local Letter Books, 1842–
1867, Public Archives of Sierra Leone.
90 For a different reading, see Inge van Hulle, “British Protection, Extraterritoriality and
Protectorates in West Africa, 1807–1880,” in Lauren A. Benton, Adam Clulow, and Bain
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When governors and chiefs negotiated over re-enslaved liberated
Africans, they were engaged in performances of gifting. In a commodity
economy, persons and things assume the social form of things. In a gift
economy, things assume the form of persons.91 For example, in Malaghea
(the town where British naval forces were routed in 1855), the liberated
African John McFoy suffered re-enslavement. During his thirty years of re-
enslavement he had married and had five children. In January 1860 he
managed to escape and travel to Freetown, where he asked the governor to
request the freedom of his family, too. In March, the king and alimamy of
Malaghea, Sanasee Famah, sent the children to Freetown. Afterward, the
governor sent the king £10.92 In other interactions, governors sent gifts that
included baft fabric, rum, tobacco, arms, and cash. These exchanges were
not commercial, because the parties were political authorities rather than
merchants, acting to resolve problems regarding inter-polity mobility rather
than negotiating over price. From the chiefs’ point of view, then, to send a
re-enslaved liberated African to another political authority was to give a gift.
It imposed an obligation on the governor to send a gift of equivalent value,
thereby building diplomatic norms, respecting mutual jurisdictions, and
consolidating commercial relationships. Such exchanges more closely
resembled the political and commercial functions of caravans than the
injunctions of officious treaties.
The local letter books, and cases like McFoy’s, tell an important story for
the period from 1839 until the late 1850s, one that complicates the conventional
argument that British imperial antislavery was the first step toward European
colonization in Africa.93 Gifting is not necessarily an exchange between
equals; it could be competitive, or overbearing, gradually reducing the
chiefs’ honor over time. But in these cases, there are good reasons to
emphasize reciprocity rather than domination. After all, if British officials
Attwood, eds., Protection and Empire: A Global History (New York, 2017), 194–210. At the same
time, it is worth noting that in the 1850s and even the 1860s, British “protection” aimed first at
protecting British subjects rather than anyone else, and extraterritorial jurisdiction concentrated
on people rather than land. Tellingly, extraterritoriality was at first an extension of criminal law,
not commercial or civil law.
91 Marilyn Strathern, The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society
in Melanesia (Berkeley, 1990), 134; Charles Piot, “Of Slaves and the Gift: Kabre Sale of Kin during
the Era of the Slave Trade,” Journal of African History 37 (1996): 31–49. On gifting and diplomacy
in Sherbro, see MacCormack, “Wono,” 199.
92 Governor to Sanasee Famah, 14 Jan. 1860 and 8 Mar. 1860, Public Archives of Sierra Leone.
The governor addresses him as both “king” and “alimamy,” and calls him “Fanah Sanassee” in the
second letter, probably because the governor was not accustomed to writing metronyms, in this case
either Mandinka or Temne. Note that “alimamy” denoted the ruler of an Islamic polity in West
Africa (similar to alikali, a compound of al-qadi). It seems likely that Sanasee Famah/Fanah
Sanassee was the same person.
93 Keene, “Case Study.”
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wished to frame the interactions with the chiefs as imperial, they could have
withheld gifts, or resorted to violence. And if the chiefs perceived the gifts
to be inadequate, they could have retained the re-enslaved liberated African,
or written a complaint to the governor. The chiefs, then, understood the
performance of gifting as the purchase of freedom of a liberated African, a
friendship between polities, and a mutual recognition of respective
jurisdictions, but not as an extension of British extraterritorial, imperial
jurisdiction.94
In the 1860s, gifting, treaty-making, and annexation overlapped. In 1861,
the Sierra Leone colony annexed Sherbro and Koya.95 But even under formal
treaty law, the return of liberated Africans could take the form of gifting.
Indeed, the governor admitted that treaties alone were not sufficient to
guarantee the return of British subjects, a status attributed to liberated Africans
settled or resident in colonial Sierra Leone in 1853. In 1865, the Reverend J.
H. Dufort asked the colonial administration to intercede with chiefs of
independent polities in the Rio Pongo area who had signed a treaty with the
governor. Dufort complained that a boy had been enslaved, yet the governor’s
secretary replied, “The colonial government cannot undertake to pay for the
liberation of the boy… you should apply to the proper chief for the boy in
question.” If the chief complied, the government could “perhaps reward him
in some shape.” The secretary did not suggest violent intervention was an
alternative. In fact, the boy would have to take the initiative and “make his
escape on board some British vessel where he would receive protection.”96
Anti-slave-trade law involved coercive intervention and value exchange as
interchanging processes. Since a comprehensive, shared worldview could not be
derived from the treaties, value exchanges via local agents were a crucial source
of law: they represented and reinforced respective jurisdictions, consolidated
relations between elites, and protected liberated African status.
As well as shaping relations between the Sierra Leone colony and the
chiefs of the Upper Guinea Coast, equating the “value” of a liberated
African with material or financial assets shaped ongoing relations between
Britain and Brazil. In 1858, the British and Brazilian governments
established a mixed commission to evaluate various compensation claims.
Brazilian subjects made ninety-eight claims to compensation for the
allegedly unlawful captures of slave ships by Britain’s navy. British subjects
made fifty-two claims regarding the costs and loss of property incurred due
to rebellions, insurrections, and port blockades in Brazil. The commission
94 On the limits of a single context for a performance, see Rutherford, Laughing at Leviathan,
107.
95 Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone (London, 1962), 316.
96 Herbert Thompson to Reverend J. H. Dufort, 15 Nov. 1865, LLB 1864–1867, Public Archives
of Sierra Leone.
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struggled to reach a verdict in various rounds of correspondence. British and
Brazilian commissioners conflicted over whether they had the authority to
review captures adjudicated at the Rio and Freetown mixed commissions for
compensation claims, how to assess the value of each claim, and a
reasonable rate of interest. The commission was suspended in 1860.
After the commission fell apart, the two governments tried to find
agreement on estimates of their respective claims via diplomatic channels.
Despite diplomats’ awareness of the liberated Africans’ plight in Brazil, their
treatment did not feature in these negotiations because it was not intelligible
under the logic of compensation. Instead, the Brazilian government insisted
that it had authority over the liberated Africans, and in 1864 it ended their
apprenticeships.
In 1866, the British minister at Rio forwarded the Brazilian compensation
cases to Whitehall, arguing that only twenty-eight of the ninety-eight original
claims were worthy of consideration. In 1871, Henry Rothery, the Treasury’s
advisor in Doctors’ Commons (for admiralty matters), reassessed these
remaining Brazilian claims. He explicitly disqualified from consideration the
cases of Activo and Perpetuo Defensor from which the recaptives had escaped
in 1826. Rothery declared that the commissary judges and Law Officers were
wrong to award conditional compensation.97 Extraordinarily, he argued that
the vessels “ought properly to have been condemned” in accordance with the
contemporaneous treaties. And yet treaty law at the time clearly exempted
slave ships that were on routes south of the equator, as the two ships had been.
Rothery was not so much a final arbiter of anti-slave-trade law as he was
engaged in an elaborate act of determining value. His performative claim was a
kind of ex post facto financial free soil.98 Perhaps Rothery was deliberately
obstructing any attempt to commensurate the rival British and Brazilian
claims. Following his advice that only five Brazilian claims were valid, the
Foreign Office drily observed that the discrepancy between the claims now
amounted to £122,568. 15s. “in favour of this country, instead of a balance,
as has always been supposed, in favour of Brazil.”99
When the Foreign Office communicated its new position, the Brazilian
government was unimpressed. A report criticized Britain’s lack of
“moderation” and defended the validity of Brazil’s twenty-eight claims.100
The Brazilian government did not try to come to an agreement. Instead, the
Conselho do Estado, the highest political authority in Brazil, focused its
97 H. C. Rothery to Earl Granville, 8 Feb. 1871, in Confidential 2656, pt. II., Correspondence
respecting Anglo-Brazilian Claims 1867–75, FO 420/25, pp. 32–62, UKNA.
98 Ibid., 40–41.
99 Foreign Office Memorandum, 20 Feb. 1871, FO 420/25, p. 64, UKNA.
100 “Observações sobre as proposições apresentadas pelas Comissarios Brasileiros” [1878–
1879?], Lata 64, maço 3, folio 133, AHI.
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energies on criticizing Britain’s anti-slave-trade policies. It claimed that their
policies violated the “Direito dos Gentes” (law of nations), which
commanded sovereigns to respect each other’s territories and territorial
waters in peacetime.101 This criticism had little effect—the Conselho had no
means to compel Britain to acknowledge its supposed rights—but it tellingly
shifted Brazil’s stance away from attempted value exchange and toward a
defense of state sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, the Anglo-Brazilian Claims
Commission fizzled out in 1875.
On the Upper Guinea Coast, British agents based at Sierra Leone and
African chiefs engaged in overlapping strategies of value exchange and
violence, even as British protectorate jurisdiction expanded over certain chiefs.
By contrast, on the Brazilian coast the prevailing norm was that sovereigns
should resolve claims through commissions. That norm limited the efficacy of
the mixed-commission court and led to the shock of naval aggression. To
resolve that shock, the sovereigns turned to the only form they knew, another
commission, which failed to determine the value of maritime commercial losses.
C O N C L U S I O N
Regulating anti-slave-trade jurisdiction led to a pattern in which coercion and
value exchange alternated, overlapped, and were mutually sustaining.
Enforcement and regulatory patterns changed when specific local factors
came together, such as liberated Africans’ initiative in making their cases
visible to British agents, diplomatic priorities, metropolitan pressures, and
local political authorities’ willingness to discuss abolition. All parties had
interests in distinguishing between enslavement, captivity, and apprenticeship
conditions. An expansive comparative Atlantic framework reveals the
connections and mutual influences between the Upper Guinea Coast and
Brazil, such as the courts of mixed commission and naval strategies. But
more than that, this comparative framework reveals convergences. These
included Siaka and the Brazilian government’s “law of nations” defense of
sovereign jurisdiction, the importance of diplomatic access for recording and
protecting liberated Africans’ status, and elites’ imposition of commodified
“value” on Africans’ lives, even during rescues from re-enslavement.
It is perhaps easier to explain how the pattern of regulation switched
between coercion and value exchange than to explain why it did so. Part of
the answer lies in the intrinsically double nature of “liberated Africans” as a
category. The Africans had the opportunity to frame their situation under
anti-slave-trade law, with treaty parties responsible for their treatment, or
under a polity’s municipal law. This doubling meant that anti-slave-trade
101 Draft opinion, Conselho do Estado 1876–1877, “Consulta sobre asilo a escravos a bordo de
navios de guerra inglezes,” Lata 342/2/9, AHI.
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legal regulation produced tension between prioritizing either the personal status
of liberated Africans or the territorial authority of local sovereigns.
Within this structural tension, regulation switched between coercion and
value exchange because of local agents’ discretionary power. These agents
were often brokers and they could choose to be aggressive or concessive, to
engage with or disengage from diplomacy. For example, Kellet, Denman,
and Jones raided barracoons in similar ways, yet Kellet’s actions have been
largely forgotten. The main difference was that he left Bolama without
engaging with Governor Nozolini or African chiefs there, whereas Denman
and Jones entered long discussions with African political authorities
regarding jurisdiction, treaties, and compensation.
Discretionary power did not operate in a vacuum. Local elites contributed
to determining how law should be regulated, sometimes as peers to British
agents, and always as their engaged critics. The Brazilian government chose
to ignore British requests for information about liberated Africans at the
Casa de Correção, and yet protested vigorously when the Cormorant
attacked the fort at Paranaguá. Both events involved British agents
intervening in Brazilian institutions such as prisons and forts. Yet Brazil’s
government was more willing to pass new abolition legislation in response
to the latter case because it had more sovereignty over ships and forts, and
valued them more highly, than it did liberated Africans. Coercion and value
exchange resulted from discretionary action that had different effects
depending on how far local political authority controlled territory and how
much value local elites placed on what (and who) was affected by the action.
The interactions between Africans’ demands, discretionary power, and
local elites point to a final paradox regarding sovereignty and the discourse
of “civilization.” British agents may have regarded Brazil as a civilized
(albeit weak) polity worthy of treatment according to the law of nations,
unlike “uncivilized” African chieftaincies. Yet one result was a British
assumption that Brazil’s governing elites had little personal authority to stop
slave-trading to and from Brazil: in a civilized polity, political authority and
commercial activity were theoretically separate realms. By the same logic,
African chiefs were “barbaric” partly because they did not separate political
representation from personal commercial interest.102 Yet such concentrated
personal authority meant that British agents were willing to believe that
African elites had greater discretion in conducting their maneuvers than did
Brazilian elites. For if elite political responsibility resided at a personal level,
then nuanced, interpersonal, responsive regulation was possible, leading to
more flexibility between coercion and value exchange.
102 The complexities of Poro, detailed above, demonstrate just how detached from reality the
civilizational ideology was.
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This difference in the perceived discretionary powers of local elites also
explains why, on the Upper Guinea Coast in the period ca. 1850–1870, value
exchange was still possible for both sides as a means of honoring treaties,
agreements, and seasonal trading patterns. These negotiations depended on
British recognition of African political authority. In Brazil, by contrast, British
violence was a stimulus for Brazil taking sovereign control of abolition through
a new law, which gave jurisdiction to its own court, the Auditoria Geral da
Marinha in Rio. The Brazilian claims commission of 1858 sat after Brazil’s
successful enforcement of its own belated abolition law. The failed 1826 treaty
between sovereigns haunted, rather than honored, the new commission’s
doomed negotiations over value. As tempting as it is to eulogize abolition as a
story of progress toward human rights and rules-based international order, in
reality abolition practices were most effective when they were most arbitrary.
Abolition law and inter-polity order resided principally in assembled actors
from Britain, Africa, Brazil, and the liberated African diaspora, and the
processes they developed. Sometimes those processes worked most flexibly
where discretion rather than sovereignty drove the legal field.
Abstract: What were the consequences of creating jurisdictions against the
transatlantic slave trade in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world? Answering
this question requires a comparative focus on the courts of mixed commission
that adjudicated naval captures of slave ships, located at Sierra Leone (the
foremost site of British abolition) and Brazil (the primary mid-century target).
Court jurisdiction conflicted with sovereign jurisdiction regarding the presence
of recaptives (“liberated Africans”), the risk of re-enslavement, and unlawful
naval captures. To rescue the re-enslaved and compensate the loss of property,
regulating anti-slave-trade jurisdiction involved coercive strategies alternating
with negotiated value exchanges. Abolition as a legal field emerged from
interactions between liberated Africans, British diplomatic and naval agents,
and local political elites in Brazil and on the Upper Guinea Coast.
Key words: abolition, Brazil, British Empire, coercion, enslavement, law, Upper
Guinea Coast, value exchange
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